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Health Law: 
SB 17 and State Regulation of Drug Pricing1 
 
Jaime S. King & Katherine L. Gudiksen 
 
The California Drug Transparency Bill (SB-17), passed in October 
2017, seeks to promote transparency in pharmaceutical pricing, 
enhance understanding about pharmaceutical pricing trends, and assist 
in managing pharmaceutical costs.  This chapter examines the legal and 
regulatory aspects of SB-17, compares it to other state efforts to 
address rising drug prices, discusses how legal and political hurdles 
constrain the ability of states to pass significant legislation to rein in 
drug prices, and offers additional information relevant to California’s 
efforts to control drug pricing.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Prescription drug spending per capita is far higher in the United 
States than in other high-income countries, exceeding $1,000 per 
person in 2016.2  While prescription drug spending has leveled off in 
recent years, prescription drug costs remain a significant financial 
burden for many.  In a 2019 national survey, nearly 30% of adults 
reported not taking their medication as prescribed in the last year due to 
cost.3  The same poll found broad, bipartisan support for many policy 
proposals to address rising drug costs, including allowing Medicare to 
negotiate drug prices, making it easier for generic drugs to come to 
market, and importing drugs from Canada.4 
In response to this public outcry, the Trump Administration 
announced a Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices,5 and Congress held 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Katherine L. Gudiksen, Timothy T. 
Brown, Christopher M. Whaley, & Jaime S. King, California’s Drug Price 
Transparency Law: Navigating the Boundaries of State Authority on Drug 
Pricing, 37 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1503 (2018). 
 2. Micah Hartman et al., National Health Care Spending In 2016: 
Spending And Enrollment Growth Slow After Initial Coverage Expansions, 37 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 150–60 (2018). 
 3. Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF HEALTH TRACKING POLL – FEBRUARY 
2019: PRESCRIPTION DRUGS – FINDINGS (2019). 
 4. Id. 
 5. American Patients First: President Donald J. Trump's Blueprint To 
Lower Drug Prices (May 2018). 
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hearings and introduced bills6 attempting to make prescription drugs 
more affordable, all with negligible success.  In the absence of federal 
action, states have recently proposed a variety of methods to regulate 
drug prices.  In the past few years, nearly every state considered bills 
designed to increase the accessibility and affordability of prescription 
medications, including bills to increase price transparency, prevent 
“excessive” price increases, regulate pharmacy benefit managers 
(PBMs), and allow drug importation from Canada.  In October 2017, 
California joined these states by passing SB-17, a bill that seeks to 
improve drug price transparency and enhance price negotiations by 
requiring specific disclosures from manufacturers and insurers. 
Despite the magnitude of action by state legislatures, the 
boundaries of state power to regulate pharmaceutical prices remains 
opaque.  The pharmaceutical industry has challenged state 
pharmaceutical-pricing laws in district and appellate courts around the 
country under a panoply of legal theories.7  Therefore, any state that 
passes new legislation should expect a formidable legal challenge from 
the pharmaceutical industry.  The uncertainty about the limits of state 
action means the precedents set in legal challenges to SB-17 may help 
resolve what power states have and may serve as a foundation for other 
states looking to pass meaningful legislation to address rising drug 
costs.  This chapter examines specific provisions of SB-17 and 
discusses how SB-17, while carefully crafted to avoid many 
preemption issues, nonetheless faces the prospect of legal challenges 
from industry and thus may have limited impact unless coupled with 
other policies.  
 
II.  Provisions of SB-17 
 
To promote transparency in pharmaceutical pricing, enhance 
understanding about pricing trends, and assist payers in the 
management of pharmaceutical costs, SB-17 requires insurers and 
manufacturers to disclose information on several aspects of pricing. 
Disclosures by Insurers.  Health plans that file rate information 
with the Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC) or California 
                                                 
 6. E.g., The Creating and Restoring Equal Access To Equivalent Samples 
Act (CREATES) of 2017, H.R. 2212, 115th Cong. (2017); The Improving 
Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act of 2017, H.R. 1776 & S. 771, 
115th Cong. (2017); The Creating Transparency to Have Drug Rebates 
Unlocked (C-THRU) Act of 2017, S. 637, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 7. E.g., Ass’n for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 
2018). 
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Department of Insurance (CDI) must submit an additional report that 
names: (1) the 25 most frequently prescribed drugs; (2) the 25 most 
costly drugs by total annual spending; and (3) the 25 drugs with the 
highest increase in total annual spending.8  In addition, large group 
plans must specify the portion of premiums attributable to prescription 
drugs and designate the proportion of any premium increase due to 
prescription costs versus other sources, such as inpatient care, 
outpatient care, and physician services. SB-17 also requires DMHC and 
CDI to report aggregated information to state legislators and the public 
and hold public meetings to discuss their findings.  With the exception 
of reported aggregated information, however, the agencies must keep 
all other SB-17 disclosures confidential. 
Disclosures by Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.  SB-17 requires 
manufacturers to notify purchasers 60 days before any price increase 
that exceeds 16% over a two-year period for all drugs with a wholesale 
acquisition cost (WAC) greater than $40.9  The WAC is a national price 
charged by the manufacturer to wholesalers.  In addition, manufacturers 
must notify the California Offices of Statewide Health Planning  
and Development (OSHPD) about any new pharmaceutical with a 
WAC above the threshold WAC of a specialty drug under Medicare 
Part D (over $670 per month).  Manufacturers must also provide 
OSHPD with information on the factors used to determine the WAC, 
usage, and marketing materials.  Overall, these provisions will provide 
policymakers with information that already exists in the public domain 
but that might otherwise be difficult to collect and aggregate.  The real 
value of these provisions, however, lies in their ability to help shape the 
scope of state legal boundaries surrounding drug pricing reform.  
 
III. Challenges in State Regulation of Prescription Drug Prices 
 
Despite state enthusiasm, the pharmaceutical industry has 
consistently challenged state attempts to promote price transparency 
and regulate price increases.  A muddled web of federal laws, including 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
federal trade-secret law, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, constrain state 
authority to regulate prescription drug pricing.  As a result, trade 
organizations representing the interests of the pharmaceutical industry 
have used all of these laws to challenge many new state laws including 
SB-17. 
                                                 
 8. CA HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.243. 
 9. Id. Div. 107 Part 2 § 127677. 
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A.  ERISA Preemption 
 
ERISA creates significant barriers to state health-reform efforts 
that affect employee benefit plans, including prescription drug 
coverage.  With a goal of establishing uniformity across states, ERISA 
establishes minimum standards for employee pension and benefit plans 
and preempts the ability of states to pass laws that “relate to” employee 
benefit plans.10  While ERISA exempts state insurance regulations from 
this preemption, it does not deem self-insured employer benefits to be 
insurance, and therefore ERISA preempts any state law that relates to 
self-insured employer plans, which cover approximately 60% of 
Americans with employer-based coverage.11  
As a result, the recent expansion of ERISA preemption has had 
devastating consequences for state attempts to control healthcare costs 
and improve price transparency.  In 2016, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Gobeille vs. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. that Vermont could not 
require self-insured employers to report their healthcare claims data  
to the state all-payer claims database because such reporting 
impermissibly intrudes on central matters of ERISA plan 
administration.12  This case represented a broad expansion in ERISA 
preemption which threatens much more than disclosure of health claims 
data. Indeed, citing Gobeille, the Eighth Circuit held that ERISA 
preempted an Iowa law requiring PBMs to report their generic pricing 
methodology from applying to PBMs that served ERISA plans.13  
ERISA has become a powerful barrier to several forms of healthcare 
price transparency legislation because states must choose between 
passing laws that will benefit only a small section of the population 
(because they exclude those with self-insured employer-based 
coverage) or risk being dragged through an uncertain, and currently 
unfavorable, legal battle over the scope of ERISA preemption.14 
SB-17 attempted to avoid ERISA preemption by only requiring 
disclosures from plans regulated by DMHC or CDI, which includes 
large- and small-group employer plans, but not self-insured employer 
plans.  As a result, lawmakers will not have pharmaceutical- spending 
                                                 
 10. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
 11. Erin C. Fuse Brown & Ameet Sarpatwari, Removing ERISA’s 
Impediment to State Health Reform, 378 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 5 (2018). 
 12. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016). 
 13. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Gerhart, 852 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 14. Erin Fuse Brown & Jaime A. King, The Consequences of Gobeille v. 
Liberty Mutual for Health Care Cost Control, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Mar. 10, 
2016). 
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data for employees of some of the largest employers in the state when 
considering other measures to address drug prices.  
 
B. Trade Secrets 
 
The pharmaceutical industry has also challenged state price 
transparency efforts for violating federal and state trade secret laws.  In 
2017, Nevada passed Senate Bill 539 (SB-539) which, among other 
provisions, requires manufacturers of “essential” diabetes drugs to 
provide information to the state, including the costs of manufacturing 
and marketing diabetes drugs, and the amount of profits attributed to 
the drug.  Because manufacturers often claim trade secret protection for 
this type of information, the state legislature amended the state’s 
definition of a trade secret to specifically exclude any information 
required by SB-539.  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) and Biotechnology Innovation Organization filed a 
civil suit15 claiming the law was preempted by the federal Defend 
Trade Secrets Act (DTSA).16  They further alleged that the law violated 
the Takings Clause of the Constitution because the state took trade 
secrets and disclosed them without proper compensation.  To settle the 
lawsuit, the state agreed to a process by which the manufacturers will 
continue to report the required information, but the state will keep 
confidential any information it reasonably considers to meet the 
standards of a trade secret under the DTSA or Exemption 4 of the 
federal Freedom of Information Act.17 
In contrast to the Nevada law, SB-17 attempts to avoid violating 
federal trade secret protections by limiting required disclosures to 
publically available information or requiring disclosures to agencies 
(like OSHPD) that must keep the information confidential.  Advance 
notification of a WAC increase should not constitute a trade secret 
because the WAC is public information that cannot be kept 
confidential.  Advance notification of an increase only speeds up the 
process of publicizing information and competitor reaction; it does not 
expose knowledge that would not otherwise become public. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 15. Complaint, PhRMA v. Sandoval, 2:17-cv-02315 (Sept. 1, 2017). 
 16. Pub. L. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (May 11, 2016), codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1836, et seq. 
 17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
76 Scholarship for the Bench [Vol. 3 
C. Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate 
commerce, and the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from 
passing laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate 
commerce without sufficient offsetting local benefits.18  In Healy v. 
Beer Institute, the Supreme Court held that the externality principle of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause forbids states from directly regulating 
commerce that occurs outside of the regulating state, “regardless of 
whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the 
legislature.”19 
Until recently, many courts narrowly interpreted the externality 
principle to only strike down laws that control prices or require price 
affirmation; link in-state prices to those charged elsewhere; or raise 
costs for out-of-state consumers or rival businesses.20  In April 2018, 
however, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the principle more broadly to 
find that Maryland’s law prohibiting price gouging for essential off-
patent or generic drugs21 violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.  The 
court held that because the law applied to drugs “made available for 
sale within the state,” the law could apply to drugs that were never 
actually sold in Maryland. Further, since the law required the state 
attorney general to review increases in the WAC for price gouging, the 
court held that the law regulated prices on transactions outside of the 
state.  Specifically, the court reasoned that the law is “effectively a 
price control statute that instructs manufacturers and wholesale 
distributors as to the prices they are permitted to charge in transactions 
that do not take place in Maryland.”22  The court “acknowledge[d] that 
the Act does not establish a price schedule for prescription drugs, nor 
does it aim to tie the prices charged for prescription drugs in Maryland 
to the prices at which those drugs are sold in other states.  But like the 
laws struck down in Healy and Brown-Forman, the Act attempts to 
dictate the price that may be charged elsewhere for a good.  Any 
legitimate effects the Act may have in Maryland are insufficient to 
protect the law from invalidation.”23  But some scholars have contested 
the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion by arguing that financial transactions 
                                                 
 18. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 90 S. Ct. 844 (1970). 
 19. 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 20. See, e.g., Ene. & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 
2015). 
 21. MD. CODE, HEALTH-GEN. § 2-802(a). 
 22. Ass’n for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 672 (4th Cir. 
2018). 
 23. Id. 
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for pharmaceutical sales already differ based on where the product is 
made, where it will be sold, and to whom it will be sold.  They assert, 
therefore, that Maryland’s law imposes neither extra burden on 
interstate commerce nor meaningful restraints on out-of-state prices.24  
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Maryland’s appeal, the 
scope of state authority to regulate in state drug prices remains 
uncertain. 
In contrast to Maryland’s law, SB-17 only requires advance notice 
of price increases and allows increases of any size (with proper 
notification).  However, under SB-17, a manufacturer must wait at least 
60 days before increasing the WAC.  Therefore, because contract prices 
with “wholesalers, hospitals, pharmacies, pharmacy benefit managers, 
payers, and others” are typically based on the WAC, a recent lawsuit by 
PhRMA challenging SB-17 argues that SB-17 effectively becomes an 
nationwide ban on price increases for certain drugs, unless California 
receives 60-day advance notification.25 
PhRMA’s challenge, if successful, will only further compound the 
inability of states to meaningfully protect their citizens from ever 
escalating drug prices.  It will also increase the incentives for industries 
to create complicated business models that buy and sell products across 
state lines in an effort to escape state regulation.  Thus, the outcome of 
court challenges to SB-17 will have significant implications for other 
drug pricing legislation and help shape the scope of judicial 
interpretation of the externality principle of the Domant Commerce 
Clause as applied to pharmaceutical legislation.  
 
D. Free Speech and Due Process 
 
In its lawsuit, PhRMA further argues that SB-17 violates the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ First Amendment right to free speech 
and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.26  PhRMA contends 
that SB-17 violates the First Amendment when it singles out 
manufacturers as the only entity that must give advance notice of drug- 
price increases, when other entities, like PBMs, also affect prices.  
Because the First Amendment does not require that legislation target all 
potential market actors equally, it is unclear whether PhRMA’s 
                                                 
 24. Darien Shanske & Jane Horvath, Maryland’s Generic Drug Pricing 
Law is Constitutional: A Recent Decision Misunderstands the Structure of the 
Industry, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (June 22, 2018). 
 25. Complaint, PhRMA v. Brown, No. 2:17-at-01323 (Dec. 8, 2017). 
 26. Id. 
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argument has merit. PhRMA also argues that SB-17 restricts price 
increase justifications to a “change or improvement” in the drug—
which does not consider other typical justifications for price increases, 
such as raising capital for research or providing increasing value to the 
health system by decreasing overall spending—essentially forcing a 
manufacturer to provide a false reason or abstain from supplying one. 
This argument’s merit is also unclear because legislators may have just 
wanted to know if the justification for the price increase resulted from a 
change or improvement.  Finally, PhRMA argues that SB-17 is 
unconstitutionally retroactive under the Due Process Clause by failing 
to specify whether WAC increases prior to January 1, 2018, would 
trigger SB-17’s reporting requirements.27  California could easily 
remedy this potential violation by agreeing to enforce the law only 
prospectively. The district court has yet to rule on PhRMA’s lawsuit.  
In order to pass effective legislation, states need clear signals from 
the courts and legislators regarding the bounds of state regulation of all 
healthcare prices, including pharmaceuticals.  As such, SB-17 
represents an important effort by a state looking to pass meaningful 
legislation that will withstand legal challenges by the pharmaceutical 
industry and help define the contours of permissible state action.  
Nonetheless, SB-17 will have minimal impact unless the state takes 
additional measures to address rising drug prices. 
 
IV.  In Isolation, SB-17 is Unlikely to Constrain Drug Prices 
 
Shortly after its passage, SB-17 was dubbed “the most 
comprehensive law aimed at shining a light on prescription drug 
prices.”28  Nonetheless, the crafting of SB-17 to avoid preemption and 
constitutional pitfalls constrains its reach in several ways.  First, the law 
will do little to directly reduce drug prices overall because 
pharmaceutical manufacturers can spread price increases out across 
drug categories and adjust rebates to maintain profits.  Second, the law 
relies on the WAC to avoid trade secret issues but, as a result, may 
make the law more susceptible to constitutional challenges.  Further, 
the law only requires disclosure of public information; rebates and 
price discounts provided to PBMs, which often dramatically alter the 
actual prices, can remain confidential.  As a result, SB-17 leaves open 
several avenues of price manipulation. 
                                                 
 27. Id. 
 28. Tracy Seipel, California assembly passes drug price transparency bill, 
S.J. MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2017). 
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Finally, because transparency alone is insufficient to encourage 
patients to price shop, SB-17 is unlikely to reduce drug expenditures 
without additional measures. Research on online price transparency 
initiatives finds only modest changes in patient behavior,29 but 
combining price transparency with targeted consumer incentives can 
lead to more sizable changes in price shopping behavior.30  
Supplementing price transparency information with a tangible financial 
incentive, such as reference pricing, has been found effective to reduce 
pharmaceutical spending and is a viable next step in drug pricing 
policy.31 
 
Conclusion 
 
California’s SB-17 forms a critical part of a movement by states to 
reduce pharmacuetical prices and to clarify the scope of states’ power 
to address healthcare prices more generally.  While innovative, SB-17 
is unlikely to have a significant impact on drug spending without 
additional incentives for consumers to use lower-priced drugs and 
additional measures to prevent market manipulation and cost-shifting.  
Nonetheless, the law remains a critical step in defining state authority 
and reflects California’s status as a leader among states looking to 
control prescription drug prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 29. Christopher Whaley et al., Association Between Availability of Health 
Service Prices and Payments for These Services, 312 JAMA 1670 (2014); 
Sunita Desai et al., Offering a Price Transparency Tool Did Not Reduce 
Overall Spending Among California Public Employees and Retirees, 36 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1401 (2017). 
 30. Christopher Whaley et al., Consumer Responses to Price 
Transparency Alone Versus Price Transparency Combined with Reference 
Pricing, AM. J. HEALTH ECON. EPUB (2018). 
 31. James C. Robinson, et al., Association of Reference Pricing with Drug 
Selection and Spending, 377 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 568 (2017). 
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